

# Communication in the Global War on Terror

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# Preface

„It was very natural,  
that's why I thought it is real.  
Why wouldn't I think different?”

# Historical background

Three waves can be divided until now:

target → weapon → platform

After the CW dramatic decrease in methods and tools

Strategic inflection point reached by the end of '90s

Several trends coincided by 2000

# Impact of changes in communication

In regular warfare is continuous.

In irregular warfare is flashing.

Younger (insurgents) vs older (counter-insurgents)!

# Some important rule

The smaller the physical power of the force, the larger the need for psychological amplification.\*

Al-Qaida: Is an operative system,  
not organization for operations,  
which is/was using an (un)organized system.

Escalation of will and escalation of force.

\* Thomas Rid: Small wars and Telecommunication, in: Modern Warfare, Ashgate, 2010, p.436.  
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# VERSUS

Individuals and communities

Anonymity

Unity of purpose

Open source information

Trust

Commons based peer-  
production

Large-state bureaucracies

Officialdom

Unity of organization

Secrecy

Mistrust

Command-based  
hierarchical operations

# Closing thoughts

„It was very natural, that's why I thought it is real. Why wouldn't I think different?“



„It was very unnatural, that's why I thought it is unreal. Why wouldn't I think different?“



Thank you very  
much for your attention!

Questions, remarks?

Used literature: Modern Warfare, Ashgate, 2010

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